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The issue of which instances of religious faith, if any, satisfy these two con-
ditions is beyond the scope of Buchak’s paper. It seems likely to me that 
some will, especially ones that have modest propositional objects and that 
are expressed by low cost actions. Less likely to pass muster, however, are 
instances of great faith, such as having faith that the Christian God exists 
and expressing that faith by an act of martyrdom.
It is worth mentioning in closing, if this is not already obvious, that 
many of the essays in this volume attempt to address controversial issues 
in philosophy of religion by first addressing controversial issues in confir-
mation theory or formal epistemology or decision theory. In some cases, the 
result is that the papers don’t get very far on the actual topics in philosophy 
of religion that allegedly motivate them. I don’t mention this as a criticism 
of the volume or of any of its essays, but I do hope that some of the talented 
authors of these essays regard their work here as initiating a research pro-
gram in the philosophy of religion instead of terminating one.1
1I am very grateful to my students, James Elliott, Jonathan Fuqua, and Mark Satta, for 
helping me with this review.
Moral Perception, by Robert Audi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013. 194 pages. $35 (cloth).
MICHAEL FUERSTEIN, St. Olaf College
In this relatively compact volume, Robert Audi offers a substantive ana-
lytical treatment of moral perception, and situates it within a broader epis-
temological intuitionism that he has developed elsewhere. Audi’s primary 
thesis is that we can perceive moral properties, and that this capacity for 
moral perception plays a major role in moral judgment and knowledge. 
On Audi’s view, by establishing a capacity for moral perception, he has 
also established the possibility of both moral objectivity and the rational 
resolution of moral disagreement (4).
The first of the book’s two sections lays out Audi’s conception of moral 
perception and the primary arguments in its favor. Audi’s view is that we 
perceive moral properties by perceiving their physical “base properties,” 
i.e., the physical properties on which moral properties are “consequential” 
(39). Thus, when we perceive someone cheating on an exam, we do not di-
rectly perceive the moral property of injustice in the way that we directly 
perceive, say, the property of roundness. Instead, we perceive injustice in 
virtue of having perceived the ordinary physical properties that instantiate 
cheating in this case. Audi’s view thus aims to show how moral perception 
is possible while avoiding an ambitious form of moral naturalism, i.e., the 
view that moral properties are part of the natural order in just the same 
way that tables, chairs, and other familiar objects of perception are. Audi 
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holds that moral properties are “perceptible” without being “perceptual” 
(35). Perceptual properties are those like color, shape, and texture, and so 
on, which are standard aspects of sense experience. “Perceptible” proper-
ties, however, are those that we perceive only through the perceptual base 
properties that realize them. Audi thus holds that his view naturalizes 
morality in at least one limited sense: we can learn about moral properties 
via the natural properties that realize them, natural properties which are 
themselves part of the natural causal order (56).
The primary philosophical opponent of Audi’s view is some form of 
“intellectualism,” which holds that ostensible instances of moral percep-
tion in fact involve either conscious or sub-conscious processes of infer-
ence or reasoning (3). On this view, one cannot perceive moral properties. 
Instead, one merely perceives events that possess moral properties (with-
out representing the moral properties themselves in perception), and then 
makes inferences which result in the attribution of moral properties to the 
events one has perceived.
So why should we side with Audi against the intellectualists? Audi’s 
core argument is, in effect, that intellectualism about moral phenomena 
commits us to implausible views about the perception of various non-
moral phenomena. Audi proceeds here mainly by extrapolating from 
examples. When we perceive anger, for example, we do so in virtue of 
having perceived the various facial features that are indicative of anger. 
But we have indeed perceived anger itself because, Audi suggests, our 
attribution of anger is not mediated by some inferential process. Rather, 
it is represented in our perceptual experience itself (59). If we deny that 
moral perception is possible because moral properties are only percep-
tible via base properties, then we seem committed to holding that anger 
and a wide range of other everyday phenomena are not perceptible either.
Given the importance of this point in the argument, it would have been 
helpful to hear something about the empirical side of things. Certainly, 
Audi is right that we talk about the perception of anger much in the same 
way, indeed, that we talk about “seeing” injustice. But whether or not our 
attributions of anger and injustice are mediated by inference seems to be 
susceptible of empirical confirmation. This reflects a more general feature 
of the book: Audi’s methodological orientation is to operate primarily 
within the bounds of a traditional philosophical approach, proceeding 
through conceptual argument, careful distinctions, and illustrative ex-
amples. Audi’s references are almost exclusively to other philosophers, 
and those hoping for significant engagement with empirical psychology 
or cognitive science will be disappointed.
The second half of the book situates the account of moral perception 
within a more general epistemological framework, focusing in particular 
on connections to intuition and emotion. Here, Audi’s discussion is par-
ticularly illuminating, unearthing a range of interesting distinctions and 
parallels among these three faculties, and showing how they might plau-
sibly serve as the basis for knowledge. It is difficult to do justice to Audi’s 
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multi-faceted discussion here, but emotion, perception, and intuition are 
united in his view by the way in which they can provide grounds for 
knowledge without inferential mediation. Audi holds that the prospect of 
moral knowledge without inference has a kind of particularist implication 
for moral epistemology (though he does not himself characterize his view 
as particularist): some aspects of moral knowledge can be acquired with-
out applying or even believing general moral principles (100). And the 
general epistemological framework here is reliabilist: our intuitive, emo-
tional, and perceptual faculties provide justificatory grounds insofar as 
they are reliable routes to true belief, even if they operate non-inferentially 
(63). Along the way, Audi offers a fascinating discussion of the parallels 
between aesthetic and ethical judgment, and also makes a foray into the 
substantial epistemological debate about peer disagreement.
Audi does not aim to give knock-down arguments for his views. In-
stead, the strategy is to make the prospect of moral perception, and moral 
knowledge based upon it, seem viable and attractive. Audi makes moral 
perception at least a plausible component of our epistemic landscape, in 
part because he is careful to qualify his argument at important junctures: 
moral knowledge can be but is not always perceptual, perception can be 
but is not always propositional, etc. Audi nonetheless makes some very 
ambitious claims about the implications of his argument, and the book 
would have benefited from further defense and development of these. I 
turn now to raising some critical questions about the book.
Recall that, on Audi’s view, moral perception makes possible both 
moral objectivity and the rational resolution of moral disagreement. I see 
at least two distinct kinds of problems with these claims in the context 
of Audi’s argument. The first problem concerns the significance of the 
intellectualist/non-intellectualist divide for these matters. Suppose we 
imagine an intellectualist who rejects the possibility of moral perception. 
She holds that moral knowledge is always gained by applying moral 
principles to the observation of non-moral properties, and then drawing 
an inference. What advantage is gained—so far as objectivity and ratio-
nal dispute resolution are concerned—if this extra inferential process is 
not required for moral judgment? One possible answer to this question 
centers on the general convergence of moral perception across otherwise 
heterogeneous moral agents. Perhaps individuals living in rural Somalia 
and those living on the Upper West Side of Manhattan might, when con-
fronted with some pointless act of cruelty, both perceive moral wrong-
ness. Perhaps this kind of convergence occurs across a sufficiently broad 
range of disparate moral phenomena such that it provides a substantial 
basis for rational dispute resolution. Audi sometimes seems to suggest 
this sort of point, as when he speculates, for example, that one might have 
an unavoidable intuition “that someone is doing a wrong if one sees the 
person drop wet banana peels at the top of a stone staircase in a public 
square” (99).
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But even if we suppose that we are prone to these sorts of immediate 
and compelling judgments, why does it matter whether the judgments 
are derived from some inferential process? Prima facie, it seems just as 
likely that we would be compelled to draw certain kinds of sub-conscious 
inferences as it is that we would be compelled to believe certain things 
without such inferences. What is the significant disadvantage of intellec-
tualism here?
A second and related problem concerning Audi’s claims about the rela-
tionship between moral perception and moral objectivity/rational dispute 
resolution is that Audi doesn’t give any compelling evidence that moral 
perception is in fact a reliable or convergent faculty. There is no need 
to rehearse here familiar worries about cross-cultural (and even intra-
cultural) divergence regarding moral judgments, and Audi himself does 
not deny the validity of these concerns. In a lengthy discussion on peer 
disagreement, Audi aims to show that moral disagreement can at least 
plausibly be explained by reference to rational differences among dispu-
tants (69–82). But that does not suffice to show that moral perception is 
likely to help us resolve our disagreements, particularly if the content of 
moral perception is thoroughly penetrated by moral background beliefs. 
Perception serves as an objective source of knowledge in the case of the 
physical world because at least some aspects of our perceptions of the 
physical world are relatively stable across diverse theoretical presupposi-
tions. There are at least very significant doubts about this in the moral case, 
and Audi doesn’t offer a substantial argument to diminish the credence of 
such doubts.
A related problem is that, even if our moral perceptions were stable 
across diverse background beliefs, we might simply be in the grips of 
a common delusion, as in the case of widespread convergence on rac-
ist, sexist, and anti-homosexual beliefs at various points in history. Does 
moral perception provide an independent source of evidence with which 
to check our moral beliefs? Or does it merely tend to flatter whatever our 
preconceptions happen to be? It is certainly possible that moral perception 
might serve as a kind of epistemic counterweight to our moral preconcep-
tions, and Audi’s argument goes a long way in articulating the nuances 
of such a possibility. But he does not offer much evidence to make this 
possibility seem probable. Nor does he venture any specific account of the 
conditions that tend to support perceptual reliability in the moral case.
Though the book’s arguments at some points do not go as far as one 
might hope, it nonetheless offers a richly nuanced picture of an important 
epistemological phenomenon. It also succeeds in connecting that phe-
nomenon in compelling and creative ways to important views on the epis-
temic status of intuitions and the emotions. It is written with characteristic 
analytical care and is full of illuminating examples. I strongly recommend 
this volume to anyone interested in these issues and in moral epistemol-
ogy more generally.
